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CURRENTDEVELOPMENTS
THE 2014 JUDICIAL ACTIVITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
By Christine Gray*
The three disparate cases decided by the International Court of Justice (Court or ICJ) in
2014 may not contribute much to the development of substantive international law, but they
are instructive about the operations of the Court. Perhaps the Court was not at its finest in
terms of coherent legal reasoning in these three cases; it certainly avoided difficult questions
in all of them. Yet each of the three cases had significant numbers of separate and dissenting
opinions, which sometimes reveal more about the Court’s reasoning than is apparent from the
judgment or order itself.
I. THE COURT’S JUDICIAL ACTIVITY
Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste
v. Australia)
On December 3, 2013, members of the Australian secret service, acting under a warrant
issued by the Australian attorney general, raided the Australian office of a lawyer working for
Timor-Leste and seized documents and computer data. OnDecember 17, 2013, in response,
Timor-Leste brought a case against Australia before the Court for a declaratory judgment that
the seizure and continued detention of the documents and data were a violation of its sover-
eignty and property rights.1 On the same day, it requested provisional measures: that all the
documents and data seized be sealed and delivered into the custody of theCourt; that Australia
provide a list of all the documents anddata that it haddisclosed and transmitted, and thenames
of any persons to whom it had transmitted the material; that it destroy any copies of the doc-
uments and data; and that it give an assurance to not intercept communications between
Timor-Leste and its legal advisers.2Given these allegations, it was not surprising that theCourt
ordered provisional measures on March 3, 2014, to protect Timor-Leste’s rights.3
* Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge.
1 Application Instituting Proceedings (Timor-Leste v. Austl.), para. 3 (Int’l Ct. Justice Dec. 17, 2013). All the
materials of the Court cited in this report are available on its website, http://www.icj-cij.org.
2 Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Austl.),
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures Submitted by the Government of Timor-Leste, para. 10 (Int’l
Ct. Justice Dec. 17, 2013).
3 QuestionsRelating to the Seizure andDetention ofCertainDocuments andData (Timor-Leste v. Austl.), Pro-
visional Measures, para. 55 (Int’l Ct. Justice Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Seizure and Detention]; see also Ronald J.
Bettauer, Case Report: Questions Relating to the Seizure andDetention of Certain Documents andData (Timor-
Leste v. Australia), Provisional Measures Order, 108 AJIL 763 (2014).
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But the case wasmore complicated than that. TheAustralian lawyer whose officewas raided
by the Australian secret service was working for Timor-Leste on another case involving the
actions of the Australian secret service, a case brought on April 23, 2013, by Timor-Leste
against Australia before an arbitral tribunal under the auspices of the PermanentCourt ofArbi-
tration (PCA).4 That case was an attempt by Timor-Leste to challenge the validity of the 2006
Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the East Timor Sea (2006 Treaty).5 The 2006
Treaty was one of a series of agreements elaborating on the Timor Sea Treaty.6 The Timor
Sea Treaty—agreed to on May 20, 2002, the day of Timor-Leste’s independence—had not
established amaritimeboundary betweenTimor-Leste andAustralia, but instead it established
a joint petroleumdevelopment zone onTimor-Leste’s side of themedian line between the two
states.7 The 2006Treaty revised some of the arrangements on the sharing of resources between
the two states; it also froze the parties’ maritime boundary claims for fifty years.8 Moreover, to
prevent litigationon thequestionof boundarydelimitation, in2002 (just beforeTimor-Leste’s
independence), Australia had made new reservations excluding boundary disputes from the
ICJ’s jurisdiction.9
Timor-Leste’s position before the PCA was that the 2006 Treaty was invalid because Aus-
tralia had spied on the government of Timor-Leste during the negotiations and thus had not
conducted the negotiations in good faith. Awhistle-blower,whowas a formerAustralian secret
agent, had informedTimor-Leste that Australia had bugged its cabinet office during the treaty
negotiations.10 That is, Australia had spied on Timor-Leste to find out its position during the
2006Treaty negotiations.11WhenAustralia’s behaviorwas revealed toTimor-Leste by the for-
mer Australian secret agent andmade public, Australia raided the office of Timor-Leste’s law-
yer and seized the documents that revealed Australia’s espionage.12 This seizure apparently
included material given to Timor-Leste by the whistle-blower agent.13
But Australia did not accept that it was guilty of any wrongdoing. It refused to return the
documents when asked to do so byTimor-Leste. In its pleadings before the ICJ, Australia tried
4 CaseView,ArbitrationUnder theTimorSeaTreaty (Timor-Leste v.Australia) (Perm.Ct.Arb. 2013), athttp://
pcacases.com/web/view/37 (providing general overview, including arbitrators and counsel, but no specific details
about the case).
5 Treaty onCertainMaritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea, Timor-Leste–Austl., Jan. 12, 2006, 2483UNTS
359 (entered into force Feb. 23, 2007) [hereinafter 2006 Treaty].
6 Timor Sea Treaty, E. Timor–Austl., May 20, 2002, [2003] Austl. TS 13, 2258 UNTS 3 (entered into force
Apr. 2, 2003).
7 Id., Art. 3.
8 2006 Treaty, supra note 5, Art. 12.
9 This reservation was invoked by Japan in the Whaling in the Antarctic case, see infra text accompanying notes
82–83.
10 Verbatim Record (corrected), Seizure and Detention, ICJ Doc. CR 2014/1, at 17–18 ( Jan. 20, 2014) [here-
inafter Verbatim Record, CR 2014/1] (statement of Elihu Lauterpacht, counsel for Timor-Leste); Kate Mitchell
& Dapo Akande, Espionage and Good Faith in Treaty Negotiations, EJIL: TALK! ( Jan. 20, 2014), at http://www.
ejiltalk.org/espionage-fraud-good-faith-in-treaty-negotiations-east-timor-v-australia-in-the-permanent-court-of-
arbitration (noting that “Australian intelligence services inserted listening devices into the wall of Timor-Leste’s
negotiating room under the guise of an Australian aid program concerning renovation and construction of cabinet
offices”).
11 Seizure and Detention, supra note 3, para. 27.
12 See Verbatim Record, CR 2014/1, supra note 10, at 19.
13 See Verbatim Record (corrected), Seizure and Detention, ICJ Doc. CR 2014/2, at 16–17 ( Jan. 21, 2014)
[hereinafter Verbatim Record, CR 2014/2].
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to challenge the narrative of Timor-Leste and to portray itself as the real victim.14 It invoked
national security as justification for its actions, although it did not specify the nature of the
threat to its national security until a late stage of the proceedings when it asserted its concern
that a former intelligenceofficermayhavedisclosednational security information.15 It also said
that the lives of Australian nationals—those agents who had carried out the bugging of Timor-
Leste’s offices—might be in danger.16 This type of reliance on vague national security argu-
ments to avoid scrutiny is familiar but, as MichaelWood, the former principal legal adviser to
theUKForeign andCommonwealthOffice, argued forTimor-Leste, “[N]ational security and
the enforcement of criminal law are not somemagicwand thatmakes the rights andobligations
of States under international law vanish.”17 As explained below, the Court did not accept Aus-
tralia’s position that it would be justified in using the seized material for national security pur-
poses.
This case is a strange one, with a rather novel subject matter, closely tied to proceedings in
another tribunal. It is hard to avoid the inference that Australia’s position in the 2014 provi-
sional measures case before the ICJ was driven by the PCA arbitration and, in particular, by
Australia’s desire to resist any renegotiation of the 2006 Treaty and to prevent any boundary
delimitation between itself andTimor-Leste, especially as this outcomemight lead to demands
by Indonesia for the renegotiation of its own boundary agreements with Australia.
Timor-Leste began its oral argument by referring to the history of relations between the two
states.18Australia’s record in its relationswithTimor-Leste is undoubtedly less than admirable.
In 1989, Australia had concluded the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia on the exploitation
of seabed resources in the seas between what is now Timor-Leste and Australia,19 thus implic-
itly acknowledging Indonesia’s title to Timor-Leste. The attempt in 1991 of Portugal, as the
former colonial power in Timor-Leste, to bring an action against Australia for violating inter-
national law notoriously failed because Indonesia was not included as a party to the case.20
Today, the legal duty of states not to recognize as lawful the illegal seizure of territory is even
clearer in light of Article 41 of the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on Respon-
sibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.21 This article provides that no state shall
recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of an obligation arising under a
peremptory norm of general international law and that it should not render aid or assistance
14 WrittenObservations of Australia on Timor-Leste’s Request for ProvisionalMeasures, Questions Relating to
the Seizure andDetention ofCertainDocuments andData (Timor-Leste v. Austl.) (Int’l Ct. Justice Jan. 13, 2014).
15 Seizure and Detention, supra note 3, paras. 36, 46; Verbatim Record (corrected), Seizure and Detention, ICJ
Doc. CR 2014/4, at 10, 13–14 ( Jan. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Verbatim Record, CR 2014/4].
16 See Verbatim Record, CR 2014/2, supra note 13, at 15, 20; Verbatim Record, CR 2014/4, supra note 15, at
14–18.
17 See Verbatim Record, CR 2014/1, supra note 10, at 45.
18 Id. at 13–15, 17–20.
19 Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor andNorthern
Australia [Timor Gap Treaty], Austl.-Indon., opened for signature Dec. 11, 1989, 1654 UNTS 105 (entered into
force Feb. 9, 1991).
20 Verbatim Record, CR 2014/1, supra note 10, at 13–14, see also East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 ICJ REP.
90, paras. 20, 21, 35, 38 ( June 30); Application Instituting Proceedings (Port. v. Austl.) (Int’l Ct. Justice Feb. 22,
1991).
21 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 41, in Report of the International
Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, UNGAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UNDoc.
A/56/10 (2001).
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in maintaining that situation.22 In the Wall advisory opinion, the Court reaffirmed this fun-
damental principle.23
The Court has over time evolved a clear framework for decisions on provisional measures
within the provisions of Article 41 of its Statute andArticles 74–75 of its Rules ofCourt. Some
of the applicable rules are long-standing; others, such as the requirement that the applicant’s
claim be plausible, are more recent. First, the Court must have prima facie jurisdiction on the
merits.24 This assessment was straightforward on the facts of the case as both parties hadmade
declarations under the “optional clause,” Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute.25 However, the
Court noted that Australia had reserved its right to raise questions of jurisdiction and admis-
sibility at the merits stage.26 Australia apparently envisaged that it might later rely on its res-
ervation to the optional clause, excluding disputes that it had agreed to settle by other means,
that is by resort to the PCA.27 Australia was technically entitled to do so,28 and the Court has,
in the past, come to a different conclusion on jurisdiction on the merits from its finding on
prima facie jurisdiction at the provisional measures stage—most famously in the Georgia v.
Russia case.29 In that case, it found prima facie jurisdiction at the provisional measures stage30
but later held that it had no jurisdiction to decide on the merits.31 In a related argument, Aus-
tralia suggested in its pleadings that the ICJ should defer to the PCA, arguing that the claims
for provisional measures made by Timor-Leste were not a matter for the ICJ to resolve.32 This
argument was rejected by the ICJ without discussion, as was Australia’s lengthy argument that
Timor-Leste should have resorted to Australian domestic remedies.33
Second, the Court may only indicate provisional measures where (1) the rights asserted by
the requesting party are “plausible,” and (2) a link exists between the rights that form the sub-
ject matter of the merits and the provisional measures being sought.34 This rather opaque
requirement that the rights asserted be “plausible” is a relatively recent addition to the Court’s
framework on provisional measures. It was first stipulated by the Court in Belgium v. Senegal
22 Id.
23 Legal Consequences of the Construction of aWall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
2004 ICJ REP. 136 ( July 9).
24 See Seizure and Detention, supra note 3, para. 18.
25 Id., para. 19 (citing ICJ Statute, Art. 36(2)).
26 Id., para. 20.
27 Australiamade this argument even though itwas contesting the jurisdictionof thePCATribunal.SeeVerbatim
Record, CR 2014/2, supra note 13, at 40.
28 Timor-Leste argued that Australia’s position showed a certain lack of respect for the Court. Verbatim Record
(corrected), Seizure and Detention, ICJ Doc. CR 2014/3, paras. 8–10 ( Jan. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Verbatim
Record, CR 2014/3].
29 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of RacialDiscrimination (Geor.
v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, 2011 ICJ REP. 70 (Apr. 1) [hereinafter Georgia v. Russia, Preliminary Objec-
tions].
30 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of RacialDiscrimination (Geor.
v. Russ.), Provisional Measures, 2008 ICJ REP. 353, para. 149 (Oct. 15).
31 Georgia v. Russia, Preliminary Objections, supra note 29, paras. 115–84.
32 See Verbatim Record, CR 2014/2, supra note 13, at 43–47.
33 In an earlier order dated January 28, 2014, the Court had already rejected Australia’s claim for a stay of pro-
ceedings until the PCA tribunal could decide the Arbitration Under the Timor Sea Treaty case. Question Relating
to the Seizure andDetention of CertainDocuments andData (Timor-Leste v. Austl.), Fixing of Time Limits (Int’l
Ct. Justice Jan. 28, 2014); see also Seizure and Detention, supra note 3, paras. 16–17.
34 See Seizure and Detention, supra note 3, paras. 22–23.
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in 2009.35 But it seems that theCourt in that case simplymade express what had formerly been
an unacknowledged factor in the Court’s decision making on provisional measures.
Was Timor-Leste’s claim on themerits that Australia’s actions violated its sovereignty plau-
sible?Australia didnot accept theprinciple of the inviolability of a state’s communicationswith
its lawyers,36 andTimor-Leste in its pleadings seemed to have some difficulty as to how exactly
to establish this principle. It invoked a range of different arguments, including property rights,
immunity, confidentiality as a general principle of law, and the equality of states.37 Not sur-
prisingly, little specific authority exists on this central point because it is not something that
had been doubted before this case. TheCourt said very briefly thatTimor-Leste had a plausible
case.38 Its right to communicate with its lawyers in a confidential manner with regard to issues
forming the subject matter of pending arbitral proceedings and future negotiations “might be
derived fromtheprinciple of the sovereign equality of States . . . [as] reflected inArticle 2, para-
graph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations.”39 Only Australian Judge ad hoc Ian Callinan
expressed doubt on this central issue.40 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Christopher Green-
wood was critical of the Court’s approach, preferring to base the right on a general principle
of law.41
The Court held that the “provisional measures requested . . . [were] aimed at preventing
further access by Australia to this seized material . . . and at ensuring the non-interference of
Australia in future communications betweenTimor-Leste and its legal advisers.”42 Thesemea-
sures were intended to protect the rights at stake in the merits of the case: the rights of Timor-
Leste to conduct arbitral proceedings and negotiations without interference by Australia.
Therefore, a link existed between the provisionalmeasures sought and the rights sought on the
merits.43
The most controversial part of the order was the Court’s consideration of whether the pro-
visional measures were urgently required to prevent “irreparable prejudice” to the rights in the
dispute.44 A striking feature of the Court’s order was its refusal to accept Australia’s assurances
that the confidentiality of the seized documents would be safeguarded as meaning that there
was no need to indicate provisional measures.45 Such a refusal was unprecedented. The Court
had accepted a respondent state’s assurances as to its future behavior in cases such as Great
Belt46 andBelgiumv. Senegal47 as removing any risk of irreparable harm.48TheCourt’s unwill-
ingness to do so here indicated its mistrust of Australia.
35 QuestionsRelating to theObligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), ProvisionalMeasures, 2009 ICJ
REP. 139, paras. 57–60 (May 28) [hereinafter Belgium v. Senegal].
36 Seizure and Detention, supra note 3, para. 25.
37 Application Instituting Proceedings, supra note 1, para. 10.
38 Seizure and Detention, supra note 3, para. 28.
39 Id., para. 27.
40 Id., Diss. Op. Callinan, J. ad hoc, paras. 25–28.
41 Id., Diss. Op. Greenwood, J., para. 12 (noting “a general principle of law”).
42 Id., para. 30 (Order).
43 Id.
44 Id., paras. 31–48.
45 Id., paras. 38, 42, 47.
46 Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), Provisional Measures, 1991 ICJ REP. 12 ( July 29).
47 Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 35.
48 For a strong argument against this practice, see Seizure and Detention, supra note 3, Sep. Op. Canc¸ado Trin-
dade, J., paras. 13–25.
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But theCourt’s approachwas not surprising. Australia’s undertakings had shifted over time.
The final written undertaking was provided by the Australian attorney general during the oral
proceedings on January21, 2014.49The impression givenby the attorney generalwas thatAus-
tralia sought to preserve its position by a clever choice ofwords. Australiawas pressed by certain
members of the Court on the exact meaning of its assurances.50 And, crucially, Australia in its
undertaking still reserved the right to use the data for national security purposes, including
potential law-enforcement referrals and prosecutions (apparently aimed at the whistle-
blower).51
The Court took the view that Timor-Leste’s right “to conduct arbitral proceedings and
negotiations without interference could suffer irreparable harm if Australia failed to
immediately safeguard the confidentiality of the material seized by its agents.”52 There
could be a very serious detrimental effect on Timor-Leste’s position in the Timor Sea
Treaty arbitration and in future maritime negotiations with Australia should the seized
material be divulged. Because Australia reserved the right to use the seized material for
national security purposes, the written undertaking did not remove the risk of irreparable
prejudice.53 The written undertaking of January 21, 2014,made a significant contribution
towards mitigating the imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to Timor-Leste’s rights but
did not remove this risk entirely.54
TheCourt accordingly exercised its power underArticle 75(2) of theRules ofCourt to order
provisional measures that were in whole or in part other than those requested.55 In this case,
the Court’s order of provisional measures was directed only to Australia56 —something rel-
atively unusual in the practice of the Court as it usually addresses its orders to both parties so
that it appears evenhanded at this stage of the proceedings. By twelve votes to four, it ordered,
first, that Australia ensure that the content of the seized material not be used by any person to
the disadvantage of Timor-Leste until the present case had been concluded and, second, that
Australia keep the seized documents and data under seal.57 Thus, theCourt did not order Aus-
tralia to surrender the documents to the Court, but only that they be kept under seal.58 This
result was welcomed by the Australian government as a vindication of its position, but it is
rather a minor limit on the overwhelming success of Timor-Leste.59
These first two provisional measures ordered showed amarked division in the Court. The four
dissents came from the judges of Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
49 Question Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Austl.),
Written Undertaking by Senator the Hon. George Brandis QC, Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia (Int’l Ct. Justice Jan. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Written Undertaking].
50 Verbatim Record, CR 2014/4, supra note 15; Verbatim Record, CR 2014/3, supra note 28.
51 Written Undertaking, supra note 49; see also Seizure and Detention, supra note 3, para. 45.
52 Seizure and Detention, supra note 3, para. 42.
53 Id., paras. 47–48.
54 Id., para. 47.
55 Id., para. 49.
56 See id., para. 55.
57 Id.
58 Id., para. 51.
59 See FrankBrennan,Finding a JustOil andGas Settlement BetweenAustralia andTimor-Leste, EUREKA STREET
EXTRA, Sept. 24, 2014, at http://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article.aspx?aeid42040#.VekH3PlVhBc (“The day
after the decision was delivered, the Australian stable of Murdoch newspapers carried the headline: ‘Australia wins
East Timor UN court fight.’ This was no win for Australia; it was a humiliating defeat.”).
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States.60 On the third provisional measure, the judges were almost unanimous, with the
exception of the Australian judge ad hoc, who focused on Australian law in much of his
dissenting opinion.61 The separate and dissenting opinions indicate that there was agree-
ment that Australia’s failure to give any undertaking as to its future behavior after the con-
clusion of the ICJ case meant that it was necessary for the Court to order that Australia
should not interfere in future communications between Timor-Leste and its lawyers in
connection with the PCA arbitration or with any future bilateral negotiations onmaritime
boundary delimitation.62
The parties subsequently agreed to postpone the ICJ proceedings. Ultimately, the ICJ case
may not continue beyond the provisional measures stage.63
Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand Intervening)
This casemarks the first time that Japan has appeared as a party before the ICJ. In these pro-
ceedings, Japan was the respondent in a case on a very controversial issue—the legality of
Japan’s whaling program in the Antarctic.64 Australia accused Japan of violating the 1946
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling65 (Whaling Convention) by its con-
tinued pursuit of large-scale whaling in the Southern Ocean of the Antarctic under the guise
of scientific research as part of the secondphase of its JapaneseWhaleResearchProgramUnder
Special Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II).
The sensitive nature of the subjectmatter is apparent in the sometimes intemperate language
of the pleadings. Each party tried to portray the other as subverting the Whaling Convention
system. TheWhaling Convention had been concluded and the International Whaling Com-
mission66 (IWC) had been established when the advent of long-distance factory fishing had
threatened whale stocks. The fifteen founding members were all engaged in whaling. Subse-
quently, nonwhaling states also became parties to the Whaling Convention, and in 1982, a
60 It is interesting to note—without, of course, casting any aspersions on the individual judges—that these four
states are closely linked in intelligence cooperation. For example, theUK-U.S.Communications IntelligenceAgree-
ment (Mar. 5, 1946), available at https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/agreement_outline_5mar46.pdf,
set up an arrangement subsequently joined byAustralia,NewZealand, andCanada.This agreementwas secret until
2005, and itwaspublished in2010.National SecurityAgency/Central SecurityService,UKUSAAgreementRelease,
1940–1956 ( June 24, 2010), at https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/ukusa.shtml.
61 Seizure and Detention, supra note 3, Diss. Op. Callinan, J. ad hoc.
62 See id., Sep. Op. Canc¸ado Trindade, J., paras. 46–58; id., Diss. Op. Greenwood, J., para. 30; id., Sep. Op.
Donoghue, J., paras. 5, 23.
63 ICJPressRelease 2014/28,TheCourtDecides toGrant the Parties’ Request to Postpone theOral Proceedings
Due toOpen on 17 September 2014 (Sept. 5, 2014); see alsoCertain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.),
PreliminaryObjections,1992 ICJREP. 240 ( June 26); ICJ Press Release 93/29,Certain Phosphate Lands inNauru
(Nauru v. Australia): Discontinuance (Sept. 13, 1993) (noting settlement of that case after Australia lost at the pre-
liminary objections stage). [Editor’s note:On June11, 2015, theCourt issued anorder directing the discontinuance
of the case from theCourt list, followingAustralia’s return of the seized documents and data toTimor-Leste onMay
12,2015.QuestionsRelating to theSeizure andDetentionofCertainDocuments andData (Timor-Leste v.Austl.),
Removal from List (Int’l Ct. Justice June 11, 2015).]
64 Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan;N.Z. Intervening) (Int’l Ct. JusticeMar. 31, 2014). For an excellent
case note, see Sonia E. Rolland, Case Report: Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Inter-
vening), 108 AJIL 496 (2014).
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moratoriumoncommercialwhalingwas agreed to. Japan initially objected to thismoratorium,
but it withdrew its objection in 1986.67
In this case, Japan accused Australia of trying to transform theWhaling Convention into a
total ban on whaling.68 It said that Australia sought to cloak its political and cultural prefer-
ences in the lab coat of science. In other words, by instituting these proceedings, Australia had
undertaken an emotional antiwhaling crusade. As Japan asserted, “In a world with diverse civ-
ilizations and traditions, international law cannot become an instrument for imposing the cul-
tural preference of some at the expense of others.”69 In its turn, Australia accused Japan of bad
faith: Japan had accepted the moratorium on commercial whaling but then immediately
sought “to continue commercial whaling program under the ‘guise’ of scientific research.”70
Ostensibly, the case turnedon the common legal questionof treaty interpretation: themeaning
of Article VIII of the Whaling Convention, described below.
The judgment of the Court has many unusual features.Much of it is taken up by a complex
analysis of the scientific evidence. The Court followed the format of setting out the parties’
arguments on each topic and then setting out its own position. Often it rejected both parties’
positions, and, in so doing, it left many questions unanswered. The separate opinions, dissent-
ing opinions, and declarations make clear the rather distracting gaps in the Court’s reasoning.
The final result was that the Court found that Japan’s JARPA II whaling program in the South-
ernOcean was not for purposes of scientific research under Article VIII and therefore violated
theWhaling Convention provisions establishing themoratorium on commercial whaling, the
factory ship moratorium, and the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. But the overwhelming charac-
teristic of the judgment is its caution. It contains little by way of broad statements of principle,
and its impact has been less than Australia might have sought.
One of the most striking issues was not actually dealt with by the Court in the judgment:
the question of standing and legal interest. Australia challenged the legality of the JARPA II
research program in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary, where all commercial whaling was pro-
hibited since 1994. Some of the sanctuary lies within the Australian 200 nautical-mile (nm)
zone, but much of it does not. Australia did not bring the action as an injured state, and it did
not mention the issue of standing or legal interest until the oral proceedings.71 It is more sur-
prising that Japan in its countermemorial did not raise this question in order to challenge the
admissibility of Australia’s claim, apart from a passing mention where it said that “what is in
reality a matter of multilateral marine resource management has been disguised as a bilateral
legal dispute and brought before the Court while efforts are being made through the proper
forum (the IWC) to overcome differences among the Contracting Governments.”72 It was
only when Judge Dalveer Bhandari asked a question during the oral proceedings—“What
67 See Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 64, para. 100.
68 Verbatim Record (corrected), Whaling in the Antarctic, ICJ Doc. CR 2013/12, at 42, 63 ( July 2, 2013).
69 Id. at 63.
70 Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 64, para. 101; see alsoMemorial of Australia, Whaling in the Antarctic,
para. 5.122 (Int’l Ct. Justice May 9, 2011) (“Japan lacks the requisite good faith in its implementation of Article
VIII.”); VerbatimRecord (corrected),Whaling in theAntarctic, ICJDoc.CR2013/11, at 24–40 ( June 28, 2013).
71 See infra text accompanying notes 73–74; see alsoVerbatimRecord (corrected),Whaling in the Antarctic, ICJ
Doc. CR 2013/18, at 28 ( July 9, 2013) [hereinafter Verbatim Record, CR 2013/18].
72 Counter-Memorial of Japan, Whaling in the Antarctic, para. 13 (Int’l Ct. Justice Mar. 9, 2012).
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injury, if any, has Australia suffered as a result of Japan’s alleged breaches of the [WhalingCon-
vention] through JARPA II?”73 —that Australia addressed the issue. It did not claim to be an
injured state on the ground that some of the JARPA II killing of whales took place in areas over
which Australia claimed sovereign rights. Instead, Australia invoked the Court’s radical deci-
sion on erga omnes obligations in its judgment in Belgium v. Senegal: “Every party has the same
interest in ensuring compliance by every other party with its obligations under the 1946 Con-
vention. Australia is seeking to uphold its collective interest, an interest it shares with all other
parties.”74 Nevertheless, Australia did not challenge Japan’s other so-called scientific research
programunder Article VIII, the second phase of the JapaneseWhale Research ProgramUnder
Special Permit in the North Pacific (JARPN II).75
The Court did not discuss this question of standing or legal interest. Nor do the separate
opinions and dissenting opinions address this point. This decision seems to follow the
approach inBelgiumv. Senegal, butwithout express acknowledgment that it is doing so. In that
case, Belgium was allowed to bring a case for violation of the UN Convention Against Tor-
ture,76 and to seek the cessation of wrongdoing by Senegal, on the ground that parties to the
Convention had a common interest to ensure the prevention and punishment of torture.77
That common interest implied that the obligationswere owed by any party to all the other par-
ties; they could be defined as obligations erga omnes partes. InBelgium v. Senegal, the Court did
not expressly mention Article 48 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. It provides for a noninjured state
to invoke state responsibility if the obligation breached is owed to a group of states, including
that state, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group.78 At the time
of the adoption of the Articles, the International LawCommission had said in its commentary
that Article 48 involved a measure of progressive development.79 It seems nevertheless to have
been the catalyst that led the Court finally to give practical effect to the famous dictum in the
73 Verbatim Record (corrected), Whaling in the Antarctic, ICJ Doc. CR 2013/13, at 73 ( July 3, 2013).
74 Verbatim Record, CR 2013/18, supra note 71, at 28, 33 (citing Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 35); see also
Reservations to theConventionon thePrevention andPunishment ofGenocide,AdvisoryOpinion, 1951 ICJREP.
15 (May 28). New Zealand intervened under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute as a party to the Whaling Convention,
and, in itsWrittenObservations to the Court, it stressed the collective nature of the Convention regime. NewZea-
land left the IWC in 1968 because of its concern that the IWC was insensitive to conservation; New Zealand
rejoined the IWC in 1976. Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 64, para. 44.
75 This reserve is understandable because of Australia’s domestic political focus on the Southern Ocean. Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd had given an election pledge to seek the end of Japan’s whaling in the Southern Ocean. See Tim
Stephens, InternationalEnvironmentalDisputes:ToSue orNot to Sue?, inLITIGATINGINTERNATIONALDISPUTES284,
287 (Natalie Klein ed., 2014). The extension of the case to cover JARPN II would also have meant a significantly more
preparation. Australia’s memorial concerning JARPA II alone was already 1,251 pages long.However, this omission was
to have serious consequences, and the exclusive focus on JARPA II weakened Australia’s claim to be acting to uphold the
collective interest.
76 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 UNTS 113.
77 SeeQuestions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), 2012 ICJ REP. 422, paras.
68, 69 ( July 20).
78 Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 21, Art. 48.
79 See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 279 (2002).
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1970 Barcelona Traction case, asserting the existence of erga omnes obligations owed to the
international community.80
The fact that the Court inWhaling in the Antarctic followed the approach ofBelgium v. Sen-
egal seems to indicate that the right of a party to a treaty to bring a legal action before theCourt
for breach of obligations to all the other parties is now accepted.However, considerable uncer-
tainty still remains about the scope of this right, given the lack of express discussion inWhaling
in the Antarctic. The subject matter of the treaty inWhaling in the Antarctic was very different
from that in Belgium v. Senegal. Moreover, both decisions concerned a multilateral treaty; it
is not clear whether one state could bring an actio popularis on behalf of the international com-
munity in the absence of a treaty. And the Court did not discuss the appropriate remedies in
this type of action. Some of these issues may be raised before the Court in the pending cases
brought by the Marshall Islands against certain nuclear-weapons states for violation of the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.81
Instead of raising this issue of standing, Japan relied onAustralia’s 2002 reservation to its accep-
tance of the “optional clause” in Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute as the basis for its challenge to the
Court’s jurisdiction.82 The reservation excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction “any dispute con-
cerning or relating to the delimitation ofmaritime zones, including the territorial sea, the exclusive
economiczoneandthecontinental shelf,orarisingoutof,concerning,orrelatingtotheexploitation
of anydisputedareaofor adjacent to any suchmaritimezonepending its delimitation.”83Asnoted,
oneof theaimsbehind this reservationwas topreventEastTimor, as itwasknownthen, frombeing
able to bring a boundary delimitation case against Australia. This reservation was now invoked
against Australia by Japan under the doctrine of reciprocity.
The Australian reservation was not very clearly drafted. Australia argued that it applied only
when there was a dispute about overlapping claims to sovereign rights; it had no such dispute
with Japan, and, therefore, the Court had jurisdiction.84 Japan said that the reservation should
be interpreted more broadly to exclude disputes about the exploitation of resources in areas
having unresolved delimitation issues (as was the case with regard to Australia’s possible mar-
itime zones in the Antarctic), even though no overlapping claims existed between the parties
to the case before the Court.85 The Court agreed with Australia on this point. It invoked its
earlier jurisprudence on the proper approach to the interpretation of reservations: the Court
should interpret them in “‘a natural and reasonable way . . . , having due regard to the inten-
tion [of the reserving state].’”86 That intention could be deduced, not only from the text, but
80 BarcelonaTraction, Light andPowerCompany (Belg. v. Spain), SecondPhase, 1970 ICJREP. 3 (Feb. 5). Such
a right had earlier been rejected by the Court in the SouthWest Africa cases brought by Ethiopia and Liberia against
South Africa for its violation of the mandate in its treatment of South West Africa (now Namibia). South West
Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 ICJ REP. 6 ( July 18).
81 Application Instituting Proceedings (Marsh. Is. v. UK) (Int’l Ct. Justice Apr. 24, 2014) (alleging violations
of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, 729 UNTS 161); Appli-
cation Instituting Proceedings (Marsh. Is. v. India) (Int’l Ct. Justice Apr. 24, 2014) (same); Application Instituting
Proceedings (Marsh. Is. v. Pak.) (Int’l Ct. Justice Apr. 24, 2014) (same).
82 Counter-Memorial of Japan, supra note 72, para. 9.1.
83 Alexander John Gosse Downer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia, Declarations Recognizing the Juris-
diction of theCourt asCompulsory (Mar. 22, 2002), available athttp://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p15&p2
1&p33&codeAU.
84 Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 64, paras. 34–35.
85 Id., paras. 32–33.
86 Id., para. 36 (quoting Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (UK v. Iran), Jurisdiction, 1952 ICJ REP. 93, 104 ( July 22)).
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also from “‘an examination of the evidence regarding the circumstances of its preparation and
the purposes intended to be served.’”87 Australia’s intention stated at that time showed that the
reservation was to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction over disputes concerning the delimitation
of maritime zones. No such dispute existed between Australia and Japan.88
The Court began its consideration of the merits with an examination of the regime estab-
lished by theWhalingConvention.89 TheConvention included a Schedule—the “substantive
provisions regulating the conservation of whale stocks or the management of the whaling
industry”—as an“integral part.”90This Schedule couldbe amendedby a three-quartersmajor-
ity of the IWC, made up of representatives of all the contracting governments, but such an
amendment couldnot bind anobjecting state.91The IWChas amended theConventionmany
times, and the Schedule now includes three prohibitions on commercialwhaling activity: para-
graph 7 prohibits all commercial whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary; paragraph 10(d)
imposes amoratoriumon the use of factory ships, except in relation tominkewhales; and para-
graph 10(e) provides for a moratorium on commercial whaling.92
The IWCwas also given the power to pass resolutions and to adopt guidelines tomake non-
binding recommendations to the contracting governments on matters relating to whales or
whaling.93 According to the Court, “The functions conferred on the [International Whaling]
Commission havemade theConvention an evolving instrument.”94 A key issue in the case was
what this sentence means in practice. The Court took a strict view; when resolutions “are
adopted by consensus or by a unanimous vote, they may be relevant for the interpretation of
the Convention or its Schedule” because they comprise subsequent agreement and practice
under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.95 Australia tried at
several points in the case to argue for a more flexible approach to treaty interpretation. It
claimed that IWC resolutions urging Japan to reconsider its program of lethal research, even
if not adopted by consensus, “must inform” the interpretation of theWhaling Convention.96
The Court refused to accept this radical approach. Resolutions adopted without the support
of all states parties and, in particular, without the concurrence of Japan could not be regarded
as subsequent agreement or practice.97
The central treaty provision in the case was Article VIII of theWhaling Convention. It pro-
vides for a special-permit systemto licensewhaling forpurposes of scientific research. Japanhad
granted such a special permit for its JARPA IIwhalingprogram.98Australia claimed that Japan’s
real purpose was to continue commercial whaling under the guise of scientific research,
87 Id. (quoting Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 ICJ REP. 432, para. 49 (Dec. 4)).
88 Id., para. 39.
89 Id., paras. 42–47.
90 Id., para. 45.
91 Id.
92 Id., para. 48.
93 Id., paras. 46–47.
94 Id., para. 45.
95 Id., paras. 46, 83.
96 Id., para. 79.
97 Id., para. 83. Judge ad hocHilary Charlesworth (Australia) agreed with the Court’s position on this point but
suggested that resolutions passed by a majority could be “relevant to the duty of co-operation.” Id., Sep. Op.
Charlesworth, J. ad hoc, para. 4; see also infra text accompanying notes 182–83.
98 See, e.g., Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 64, para. 30.
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although it had accepted the moratorium in 1986.99 This issue was the core of the case. The
Court had to decide whether the special permits granted in relation to JARPA II fell within the
scope of Article VIII, which provides:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention any Contracting Government
may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take and
treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and
subject to such other conditions as theContractingGovernment thinks fit, and the killing,
taking, and treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be
exempt from the operation of this Convention.100
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article VIII is to “be interpreted in
light of the object and purpose of the [Whaling] Convention.”101 The parties fundamentally
disagreed on what the object and purpose were. Each made very selective use of the preamble
in its pleadings. For Japan, the aim of the Convention was “to ‘establish a system of interna-
tional regulation for the whale fisheries,’”102 and “the proper conservation of whale
stocks . . . [made] possible the orderly development of the whaling industry.”103 Japan argued
that “the power to authorize the taking of whales for purposes of scientific research should be
viewed in the context of the freedom to engage in whaling . . . under customary international
law.”104 Australia, in contrast, argued that the object and purpose of the Convention was con-
servation.105 It called for a restrictive interpretation of Article VIII as “an exception to the gen-
eral rules of the Convention that give effect to its object and purpose of conservation.”106
The Court began its discussion of the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention by
recalling that the preamble indicates that the Convention seeks to ensure “the conservation of
all species of whales while allowing for their sustainable exploitation.”107 However, it did not
expressly decide this issue of object and purpose. It said only that neither a restrictive inter-
pretation, as arguedbyAustralia, nor an expansive interpretation, as arguedby Japan, ofArticle
VIII was justified.108 Moreover, programs for purposes of scientific research “may pursue an
aim other than either conservation or sustainable exploitation of whale stocks.”109
The next fundamental disagreement between the parties on the interpretation of Article
VIII was on the degree of discretion that it provided to the state granting the special permits
for purposes of scientific research. Japan claimed that the state issuing the special permit
enjoyed a “margin of appreciation” and, therefore, that the Court’s power of review was lim-
ited.110 Australia and New Zealand said that the requirements for granting a special permit
99 Id., paras. 100–01.
100 Whaling Convention, supra note 65, Art. VIII (emphasis added).
101 Whaling in theAntarctic, supranote 64, para. 55;ViennaConventionon theLawofTreaties, Art. 31(1),May
23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
102 Counter-Memorial of Japan, supra note 72, para. 2.28 (quotingWhalingConvention, supra note 65, pmbl.).
103 Id., para. 2.29.
104 Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 64, para. 57.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id., para. 56.
108 Id., para. 58.
109 Id.
110 Id., para. 59. Japan initially argued that the Court’s power of review was limited “to ascertaining whether the
determination was ‘arbitrary or capricious,’ ‘manifestly unreasonable’ or made in bad faith.” Id., para. 65. Judge
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were objective.111 At this point, the Court introduced the concept of the standard of review:
theCourtmay review, onanobjectivebasis, thedeterminationby the stateparty that the special
permit is for purposes of scientific research.112 The four dissenting judges were all critical of
the Court’s approach to judicial review of Japan’s exercise of its discretion and argued that the
Court went too far.113 This assessment was the central disagreement between themajority and
the dissenting judges.
The Court adopted a two-stage approach to the interpretation of Article VIII, as suggested
by Australia in its pleadings.114 First, the Court contemplated whether the program under
which thekilling, taking, and treatingofwhales occurred involved scientific research.115 Second,
the Court considered whether the killing, taking, and treating of whales was for purposes of sci-
entific research by examining whether, in the use of lethal methods, the program’s design and
implementation were reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives.116 The Court
looked to Japan as the “authorizing State” to explain the objective basis for its determination
that JARPA II’s use of lethal methods was for purposes of scientific research.117
Thus, the Court separated its interpretation of the terms scientific research and for purposes
of in the phrase “for purposes of scientific research.”118 This division allowed the Court to say
that Japan’s JARPA II programwas capable of being “scientific research” but that its special per-
mits allowed killing that was not “for purposes of” scientific research. It is hard to make much
sense of this distinction. The dissenting judges strongly challenged this approach.119 The dis-
tinction had serious—and unforeseen—consequences on the impact of the judgment. It
allowed Japan to claima legal right to continuewhalingunder its other special-permitprogram,
JARPN II, in the North Pacific.120
Australia put forward its own interpretation of “scientific research,” maintaining that it has
four essential characteristics: “defined and achievable objectives . . . ; ‘appropriate methods,’
including theuse of lethalmethods onlywhere the objectives of the research cannot be achieved
HisashiOwada ( Japan), in his dissenting opinion, said that theCourtwaswrong to assert that the parties had agreed
on the standard of review. He asserted that the Court had adopted a standard of review that was derived from the
jurisprudence of the Appellate Body of theWorldTradeOrganization but that the ICJ had gonemuch further than
the Appellate Body and had engaged in a de novo assessment of Japan’s activities. Id., Diss. Op. Owada, J., paras.
29–48.
111 Id., paras. 63, 64 ( Judgment).
112 Id., para. 65.
113 Id., Diss. Op. Abraham, J.; id., Diss. Op. Bennouna, J.; id., Diss. Op. Owada, J.; id., Diss. Op. Yusuf, J.; see
also Sep. Op. Xue, J., para. 16 (stating that the Court had gone “beyond its judicial purview”).
114 VerbatimRecord (corrected),Whaling in theAntarctic, ICJDoc.CR2013/8, para. 68 ( June 26, 2013).New
Zealand took a simpler approach: it asserted that the Court should consider whether whaling is for purposes of sci-
entific research, which could be ascertained from themethodology, design, and characteristics of proposed whaling
program.Written Observations of New Zealand, Whaling in the Antarctic, paras. 61–63 (Int’l Ct. Justice Apr. 4,
2013).
115 Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 64, paras. 73–86.
116 Id., paras. 87–97.
117 Id., para. 68.
118 Id., paras. 70–72.
119 Judge Owada rejected the Court’s approach: “To me such a distinction is so artificial that it loses any sense
of reality when applied to a concrete situation.” Id., Diss. Op. Owada, J., para. 23. Judge Xue Hanqin (China)
declared that the distinction “unduly complicates themeaning of the phrase.” Id., Sep. Op. Xue, J., para. 16. Judge
Kenneth Keith (NewZealand), in his very clear separate opinion, did notmake any use of this distinction. Id., Sep.
Op. Keith, J.
120 See infra text accompanying note 199.
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by other means; peer review; and the avoidance of adverse effects on stock.”121 The Court
rejected Australia’s position on the basis that it did not serve as an interpretation of the Con-
vention on its own but was rather a reflection, more generally, of “well-conceived scientific
research.”122 The Court stated that it had no need “to offer a general definition of ‘scientific
research.’”123 On substance, the Court determined that “Article VIII expressly contemplates
the use of lethal methods.”124 The Court also indicated that Australia and New Zealand had
overstated the legal significance of the recommendatory resolutions and guidelines on which
they relied. Somehadbeen adoptedwithout the concurrence of Japan; they couldnot therefore
be regarded as subsequent agreement or practice.125 And the resolutions that were adopted by
consensus did not require that lethalmethods be used onlywhen othermethodswere not avail-
able.126
Having proposed a separate examination of “scientific research” and “for purposes of,” the
Court abandoned any attempt to define the first term.127 It then considered the meaning of
“for purposes of.”128 It expressly noted that it “need not pass judgment on the scientificmerit”
of JARPA II’s research objectives; “[n]or is it for the Court to decide whether the design and
implementation of a programme [were] the best possible means of achieving its stated objec-
tives.”129 TheCourt’s role was to consider “whether the elements of a programme’s design and
implementation [were] reasonable in relation to its stated scientificobjectives.”130This analysis
was the core of the case, and, despite its disclaimer, the Court involved itself in what looks like
an attempt at a scientific assessment of the merits of the JARPA II program.
An interesting feature of the case was the role of the parties’ experts. They provided reports,
took part in the oral proceedings, and were subject to cross-examination and questioning by
the judges. The Court made frequent reference to their evidence, especially where the parties’
experts were in agreement or where Japan’s own expert cast doubt on its position. This use of
experts was a striking departure from the Court’s past practice. It seems clear that the Court’s
experience in the Pulp Mills case131 led to this change of approach. There, the parties’ experts
had acted as counsel, and thus cross-examination of their evidence under Article 43 of the ICJ
Statute was not possible. InPulpMills, theCourt had commented unfavorably on this practice
and had explained that it would prefer that the experts did not in the future act as counsel.132
121 Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 64, para. 74.
122 Id., para. 86.
123 Id.
124 Id., para. 83.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id., para. 86.
128 Id., paras. 87–97.
129 Id., para. 88.
130 Id.
131 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 ICJ REP. 14 (Apr. 20).
132 Id., para. 167. Judge Christopher Greenwood (United Kingdom), in his separate opinion in Pulp Mills, dis-
cussed the problems caused by the parties’ use of experts as counsel. Id., Sep. Op. Greenwood, J., paras. 27–28.
JudgesAwnShawkatAl-Khasawneh ( Jordan) andBrunoSimma (Germany), in their joint dissentingopinion,went
further and claimed that the use of experts as counsel hadmeant that theCourt’s method of evaluating the scientific
evidence was flawed. Id., Diss. Op. Al-Khasawneh & Simma, JJ., para. 2. They also criticized the Court’s practice
of using “experts fantoˆmes” as temporary Registry staffmembers on grounds of lack of transparency and procedural
fairness. Id., para. 14. They called on the Court, in the future, to appoint its own experts under Article 50 of its
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The Court’s change of approach in the Whaling in the Antarctic case is to be welcomed, as it
offers the opportunity for a more rigorous treatment of complex scientific evidence.
The Court began its examination of whether the JARPA II program was “for purposes of”
scientific research by disposing of two general arguments put forward by Australia.133 First,
Australia argued that the quantity of whalemeat generated by JARPA II “cast doubt onwhether
the killing, taking and treating ofwhales [was] for purposes of scientific research.”134However,
as the Court stated, Article VIII allows the sale of whale meat, and the sale of whale meat and
its use to fund research were not sufficient on their own to cause a special permit to fall outside
ArticleVIII.135 Second,Australia argued that a state’s “pursuit of policy goals such as providing
employment or maintaining a whaling infrastructure would indicate that the killing of whales
[was] not for purposes of scientific research.”136 The Court held that “a State often seeks to
accomplishmore than one goal when it pursues a particular policy.”137 As noted, the key ques-
tion was not the intentions of individual government officials but “whether the design and
implementation of a programme are reasonable in relation to achieving the stated research
objectives.”138
In consequence, the Court reviewed the design and implementation of JARPA II.139 Aus-
tralia argued that, although Japan withdrew its objection to the moratorium on commercial
whaling in 1986, it began its original JARPA program in 1987 “to continue commercial whal-
ing under the ‘guise’ of scientific research.”140 JARPA had run from 1987 to 2005; it had killed
6,700 Antarctic minke whales.141 This program was immediately followed by JARPA II,142
whichwas the subject of the case before theCourt. JARPA II had four stated research objectives:
“(1) Monitoring of the Antarctic ecosystem; (2) Modelling competition among whale species
and future management objectives; (3) Elucidation of temporal and spatial changes in stock
structure; and (4) Improving themanagementprocedure forAntarcticminkewhale stocks.”143
It involved three types of whales: the plan was to take 850 minke whales, 50 fin whales, and
50 humpback whales each year.144 Although the Court had not adopted a general definition
of “scientific research,” it nevertheless held (without explanation) that “the JARPA II activities
involving the lethal sampling of whales can broadly be characterized as ‘scientific research.’”145
Australia argued that JARPA II’s use of lethal methods was “merely a guise” for commercial
Statute. Id., para. 8. Judge Keith, in his separate opinion, argued against this suggestion. Id., Sep. Op. Keith, J.,
paras. 8–11; see alsoDaniel Peat,TheUse of Court-Appointed Experts by the International Court of Justice, 2014BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 271.
133 Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 64, paras. 90–97.
134 Id., para. 91.
135 Id., para. 94.
136 Id., para. 95.
137 Id., para. 97.
138 Id.
139 Id., paras. 98–227.
140 Id., para. 101.
141 Id., para. 104.
142 Id., para. 105.
143 Id., para. 113.
144 Id., para. 123.
145 Id., para. 127.
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whaling.146 But the Court found “no basis to conclude that the use of lethalmethods [was] per
se unreasonable.”147 However, Japan had carried out little analysis of whether the objectives
of JARPA II could have been achieved bymaking greater use of nonlethalmethods.148This out-
come was “difficult to reconcile with Japan’s obligation to give due regard to IWC resolutions
and Guidelines and its statement that JARPA II use[d] lethal methods only to the extent nec-
essary to meet its scientific objectives.”149 Moreover, the scale of the use of lethal methods in
JARPA II was determined by “sample sizes, that is, by the number of whales of each species to
be killed each year.”150
The Court embarked on its detailed analysis of the scientific evidence, as if determined to
demonstrate that it is a suitable forum for cases involving complex environmental issues. It
devoted sixty-eight paragraphs to sample sizes, including a table, a diagram, and statistical
assessments.151 The JARPA II program involved amuch greater sample size than that of its pre-
decessor, JARPA. Japan justified this increase by reference to the differences between the two
programs: the “new objectives” of JARPA II to carry out ecosystem research and to construct
a model of multispecies competition called for an increase in lethal sampling.152 However, the
Court concluded that the overall research objectives of JARPA II and its predecessor JARPA had
much in common. “These similarities cast doubt on Japan’s argument that the JARPA II objec-
tives relating to ecosystem monitoring and multi-species competition are distinguishing fea-
tures of the latter programme that call for a significant increase in the minke whale sample size
and the lethal sampling of two additional species.”153 Moreover, Japan had launched JARPA
II without waiting for the results of the final review of JARPA by the IWC’s Scientific Com-
mittee.154
Australia asserted that Japan failed to provide “‘a coherent scientific rationale’ for the JARPA
II sample sizes.”155 It also claimed that Japan “wished to take approximately 850minke whales
for purposes other than scientific research and then ‘retro-fitted’ individual sample sizes to jus-
tify the overall sample size.”156 Japan indicated that its sample sizes were based on a standard
scientific formula and on norms used by the IWC’s Scientific Committee.157 The Court
referred to the expert evidence: Japan’s own expert had said that “‘Japanese scientists ha[d] not
always given completely transparent and clear explanations of how sample sizeswere calculated
or determined.’”158
The Court could arguably have stopped there, but it then described, in considerable detail,
a five-step process of sample-size determination.159 The Court identified several features of
146 Id., para. 130.
147 Id., para. 135.
148 Id., paras. 136–41.
149 Id., para. 144.
150 Id., para. 145.
151 Id., paras. 145–212.
152 Id., para. 149.
153 Id., para. 153.
154 Id., para. 154.
155 Id., para. 158.
156 Id.
157 Id., para. 159.
158 Id. (quoting Japan’s expert on this issue).
159 Id., paras. 160–98.
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JARPA II that cast doubt on the reasonableness of Japan’s position. Japan employed different
research periods for different species of whales; it had “not address[ed] how disparate research
time frames for the three whale species [were] compatible with JARPA II’s research objectives
relating to ecosystemmodelling andmulti-species competition.”160 In addition, the small sam-
ple sizes for fin and humpback whales were not large enough “to produce statistically relevant
information.”161 Japan’s own expert had raised concerns about this result.162 As to the
increased sample size for high-value minke whales, Australia alleged that “the minke whale
sample size was set not for purposes of scientific research, but instead to meet Japan’s funding
requirements andcommercial objectives.”163The JARPA II researchplanprovidedonly limited
information about the basis for the calculation of sample sizes, and the parties’ experts had
agreed on this point.164 “These shortcomings . . . [were] important to the Court’s assessment
of whether the overall design of JARPA II [was] reasonable in relation to the programme’s
objectives. . . .”165
Finally, the Court compared sample size to the actual take of whales.166 Far fewer finwhales
were taken than the target set, and no humpback whales were taken.167 What seems to have
weighed heavily with theCourt was that Japan had notmade any changes to the objectives and
target sample sizes, “despite the number of years in which the implementation of JARPA II
ha[d] differed significantly from the design of the programme.”168 This inaction “cast doubt
on [the] characterization of [JARPA II] as a programme for purposes of scientific research.”169
So did the open-ended time frame and limited scientific output of JARPA II.170
Overall, the Court reasoned that JARPA II involved activities that could “broadly be char-
acterized as scientific research . . . , but that the evidence [did] not establish that the pro-
gramme’s design and implementation [were] reasonable in relation to achieving its stated
objectives.”171 The special permits were “not ‘for purposes of scientific research’ pursuant to
Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention.”172 The Court then spelled out the implications
of this conclusion: JARPA II fell outside Article VIII. Consequently, as Australia had alleged,
Japan had violated three provisions of the Schedule: the moratorium on commercial whaling,
the factory ship moratorium, and the prohibition of commercial whaling in the Southern Ocean
Sanctuary.173Here again, theCourtwas cautious in its pronouncements. It said that therewas “no
reason to evaluate the evidence” put forward by the parties as to whether JARPA II had “attributes
of commercial whaling.”174 And despite all its doubts about the JARPA II program, the Court did
160 Id., para. 194.
161 Id., para. 179.
162 Id., para. 180.
163 Id., para. 184.
164 Id., paras. 180–81.
165 Id., para. 181.
166 Id., paras. 199–212.
167 Id., para. 201.
168 Id., para. 209.
169 Id., para. 226.
170 Id.
171 Id., para. 227.
172 Id.
173 Id., paras. 228–33.
174 Id., para. 230.
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not accept Australia’s allegation that Japan had acted in bad faith; it was not willing to draw this
inference based on the evidence before it.175
TheCourtalso tookacautiousapproachas regardsAustralia’s claimthat Japanhadviolatedpara-
graph 30 of the Schedule.176 This paragraph provides that the IWC’s Scientific Committee may
reviewor commenton special permits before they are issuedby the states parties underArticleVIII.
TheScientificCommitteeconducts its reviewsonthebasisofguidelines issuedbytheIWC.177Aus-
tralia argued that Japanhad violated its obligation “tomakeproposedpermits available to the IWC
Secretary before they are issued, in sufficient time to allow review and comment by the Scientific
Committee.”178 Japan did not provide permits before the start of each season, and the annual per-
mits did not contain adequate information.179 The Court rejected this claim by thirteen votes to
three.180 It held that “the lack of detail . . . [was] consistent with that fact that the programme is a
multi-year programme.”181 Nevertheless, it stated that paragraph 30 “must be appreciated in light
of theduty of co-operationwith the IWCand its ScientificCommittee . . . [and that] [u]nder such
circumstances, consideration by a State party of revising the original design of the programme for
reviewwoulddemonstrateco-operation.”182This statementseemstobeanimplicit rebuketoJapan
for its failure to submit a revised researchplanwhen it became apparent that its initial JARPA II pro-
gram had been adjusted. The three judges who dissented on this point, Judges Bhandari, Julia
Sebutinde,andHilaryCharlesworthwantedtoreadmore intoparagraph30, togiveawidercontent
to procedural obligations.183
As to remedies, the Court, as too often in the past, did not give any extended consideration
to this question.184 Australia had asked the Court for a declaratory judgment that Japan had
violated three paragraphs of the Schedule.185 The Court, by twelve votes to four, stated that
the special permits granted by Japan under JARPA II did not fall within Article VIII and that
Japanhad “not acted in conformitywith its obligations” under the prohibitions on commercial
whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary, the moratorium on commercial whaling, and the
use of factory ships.186 The Court further expressed that “JARPA II [was] an ongoing pro-
gramme . . . [and that] measures that go beyond declaratory relief are warranted.”187 The
Court ordered Japan to “revoke any extant authorization, permit or licence in relation to JARPA
II, and refrain from granting any further permits under Article VIII in pursuance of that pro-
gramme.”188Yet theCourt saw“noneed toorder the additional remedy requestedbyAustralia,
175 Id., para. 243 (noting that “the Court does not need to address other arguments invoked by Australia in sup-
port of its claims”).
176 Id., paras. 234–42.
177 Id., paras. 47, 234.
178 Id., para. 234.
179 Id., para. 236.
180 Id., para. 247.
181 Id., para. 239.
182 Id., para. 240.
183 Id., Sep.Op.Bhandari, J., paras. 11–19; id., Sep.Op. Sebutinde, J., paras. 15–20; id., Sep.Op.Charlesworth,
J. ad hoc, paras. 11, 14–17.
184 Id., paras. 244–47 ( Judgment).
185 Id., para. 244.
186 Id., para. 247.
187 Id., para. 245.
188 Id., para. 247.
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which would require Japan to refrain from authorizing or implementing any special permit
whaling which is not for purposes of scientific research within themeaning of Article VIII.”189
The Court noted: “That obligation already applies to all States parties. It is to be expected that
Japanwill take account of the reasoning and conclusions contained in this Judgment as it eval-
uates the possibility of granting any future permits under Article VIII . . . .”190
However, the aftermath throws somedoubt on this expectation.TheCourt’s cautious approach
arguably left it open to Japan to pursue its whaling programs. As noted, the Court did not say that
Japanwasguiltyofbadfaith.While thishypothesismight seemtobe the inference tobedrawnfrom
its judgment, as certain judges pointed out, a high standard of proof applies to such a claim.191The
Court didnot expressly assert that the “precautionaryprinciple” acceptedbybothparties shouldbe
applicable to whaling, and it did not support a radical approach to the interpretation of environ-
mental conventions. It did not read a broad duty to cooperate into Article 30’s procedural obliga-
tions. Most important, it accepted that JARPA II was broadly scientific research. It did not specif-
ically state that JARPA II was commercial whaling, although that was the inference from its finding
that Japan’s killingofwhales in theSouthernOceanwasnot for purposes of scientific research.The
Court’s many doubts about Japan’s program led it to this conclusion. But the judgment may well
have theperverse effectof guiding Japanas tohowtomodify itswhalingprogramunder the special-
permit system to ensure that it will in the future appear to be “for purposes of” scientific research.
The IWCwas not able to reach consensus on its response to the ICJ judgment.192NewZea-
land proposed a resolution on the implications of the judgment, designed to make scientific
whaling harder in the future, but it, too, could not achieve consensus.193 By its vote on the res-
olution, Japan indicated that it would not be bound by its provisions.194On the day of the ICJ
judgment, Japan stopped JARPA II, and it suspended whaling in the Antarctic for a year, but
it appears obdurate in its commitment to whaling.195 It interprets the significance of the judg-
ment narrowly. It promised to review its research program and to submit a new whaling plan
that takes account of the ICJ judgment.196 It did so in November 2014.197 It now plans to kill
189 Id., para. 246.
190 Id.
191 Id., Diss. Op. Owada, J., para. 42; id., Diss. Op. Abraham, J., paras. 28–31; id., Diss. Op. Yusuf, J., para.
54; id., Sep. Op. Greenwood, J., para. 29.
192 See InternationalWhalingCommittee,Chair’s Report of the 65thMeeting, sec. 7.5 (Oct. 31, 2014), available
at https://archive.iwc.int/pages/terms.php?ref3683&search%21collection49&k&urlpages%2Fdownload_
progress.php%3Fref%3D3683%26size%3D%26ext%3Dpdf%26k%3D%26search%3D%2521collection49%26
offset%3D0%26archive%3D0%26sort%3DDESC%26order_by%3Drelevance [hereinafter Chair’s Report] (outlin-
ing proposed resolution on whaling under special permit).
193 International Whaling Commission, Resolution 2014-5, Whaling Under Special Permit 19–21 (2014),
availableathttps://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref3600&search%21collection110&order_byrelevance&sortDE
SC&offset0&archive0&k&curpos2[hereinafterIWCResolution2014-5](notingpassageofResolution2014–5by
thirty-five votes to twenty); see alsoChair’s Report, supra note 192, paras. 141–59, 253.
194 IWC Resolution 2014-5, supra note 193, at 24.
195 See Anthony Fensom, Japanese Whaling: The Saga Continues, DIPLOMAT, Aug. 26, 2014, at http://thedip-
lomat.com/2014/08/japanese-whaling-the-saga-continues.
196 Government of Japan Press Release, Policy Towards the Future Whale Research Programs, Statement
by Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Apr. 18, 2014), at http://webcache.googleusercontent-
.com/search?qcache:http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/e/pdf/danwa.pdf; see also Chair’s Report, supra note 192,
sec. 15.3.
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3,996minke whales in the SouthernOcean over the next twelve years.198 Japan has also taken
the position that the judgment does not apply to JARPN II in the North Pacific, even though
JARPN II resembles JARPA II. Accordingly, it authorized two whale hunts in theNorth Pacific
in 2014.199 Japan also persists in its attempts to secure authorization for “small-type coastal
whaling” to catchminkewhales under the exemptionprovided for aboriginal subsistencewhal-
ing.200 It helped to secure the rejectionof theproposal for a SouthAtlanticWhale Sanctuary.201
And Japan continues its efforts to secure votes to overturn the moratorium on commercial
whaling.202
Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile)
In 2008, Peru brought a case requesting that the Court determine the course of its maritime
boundary with Chile.203 Peru claimed that the boundary was an equidistance line from the
baselines of the two states to a distance of 200 nautical miles (nm) from those baselines.204
Moreover, beyond the pointwhere the commonboundary ended, Peruwas entitled to exercise
sovereign rights over a further area lying within 200 nm of its baselines (the outer triangle
(shown in darker blue on themap below)).205 Chile’s positionwas that themaritime boundary
had already beendelimited by agreement in the 1952SantiagoDeclaration and that it followed
a parallel of latitude.206 Themap belowhighlights the big difference between these two claims.
This type of disagreement as to whether a boundary has already been established or whether
theCourtmustdetermine theboundary is common in such cases.Buthere theCourt’s solution
was not to make a simple choice between the two lines. In part, the Court accepted the sub-
stance of Chile’s argument that an established boundary along a parallel of latitude already
existed,207 but it did not accept the basis on which Chile relied. Moreover, in part, the Court
also accepted Peru’s argument for an equidistance line.208 As so often in this type of case, the
end result looks like a compromise, although it was not openly avowed as such.
The Court’s judgment has many unusual elements. Its reasoning does not seem entirely
coherent or compelling, but the end resultmaywell be equitable. This was acknowledgedmost
198 Id.
199 Jack Simpson, Japan Kills 30 Minke Whales in First Hunt Since ICJ Ruling, INDEPENDENT, June 14, 2014,
at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/japan-kill-30-minke-whales-in-first-hunt-since-icj-
ruling-9537063.html.
200 See International Whaling Commission, IWC/65/09, Agenda Item 5: Japan’s Proposal and Its Background
for Schedule Amendment to Permit the Catching of Minke Whales from the Okhotsk Sea-West Pacific Stock by
Small-Type Coastal Whaling Vessels ( July 14, 2014) (submitted by Japan), available at https://archive.iwc.int/
pages/view.php?ref3445. This plan was rejected by thirty-nine against, nineteen in favor, and two abstentions.
201 International Whaling Commission, IWC/65/08, The South Atlantic: A Sanctuary for Whales (Submitted
by Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Uruguay) ( June 5, 2014), available at https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.
php?ref3418.
202 See JustinMcCurry, Japan Set to Wade into Diplomatic Row by Bypassing Ban onWhaling, GUARDIAN, Sept.
4, 2014, at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/04/japan-diplomatic-row-bypassing-whaling-ban-
antarctic.
203 Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), para. 1 (Int’l Ct. Justice Jan. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Maritime Dispute].
204 Id., para. 14.
205 Id.
206 Id., paras. 14, 22.
207 Id., para. 151.
208 Id., para. 181.
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clearly in the one-page declaration of Judge JoanDonoghue, who indicated that shewas happy
to vote for the judgment because she thought that “it reflects a sound outcome.”209 However,
fundamental differences existed among themembers of theCourt, with twelve judges express-
ing their ownviews indeclarations, separate opinions, anddissentingopinions.210On themost
controversial issues, they were divided by ten votes to six.211
As shown in Figure 1, Peru and Chile are adjacent states, and their shared coastline is con-
cave, mostly uncomplicated and relatively smooth. Their land boundary had been fixed in the
1929 Treaty of Lima.212 In 1947, both parties had unilaterally proclaimed 200 nm zones to
protect their fish stocks from foreign fishing boats.213 One of their main concerns was to look
after the interests of their domestic whaling fleets.214 Chile, Peru, and Ecuador subsequently
negotiated a series of instruments on maritime matters in 1952, 1954, and 1967.215 Chile
209 Id., Decl. Donoghue, J.
210 Id., Decl. Tomka, P.; id., Decl. Sepu´lveda-Amor, V.P.; id., Sep. Op. Owada, J.; id., Decl. Skotnikov, J.; id.,
Diss.Op.Xue,Gaja, Bhandari, JJ.,&OrregoVicun˜a, J. ad hoc; id.,Decl.Donoghue, J.; id.,Decl.Gaja, J.; id.,Diss.
Op. Sebutinde, J.; id., Decl. Guillaume, J. ad hoc; id., Sep. Op. Orrego Vicun˜a, J. ad hoc.
211 Id., para. 198 ( Judgment) (noting votes against the delimitation from President Peter Tomka (Slovakia),
Judges Xue, Gaja, Sebutinde, and Bhandari, and Judge ad hoc Francisco Orrego Vicun˜a (Chile)).
212 For an account of the historical background, see id., paras. 17–21.
213 Id., paras. 19, 25, 26.
214 See id., para. 26.
215 Id., para. 20.
FIGURE 1. MARITIME DISPUTE BETWEEN PERU AND CHILE
Source: Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Sketch-MapNo. 2, TheMaritime Boundary Lines Claimed by Peru
and Chile Respectively, at 16 (Int’l Ct. Justice Jan. 27, 2014).
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claimed that one of these instruments—the 1952 Santiago Declaration216 —had established
a maritime boundary.217 It also relied on subsequent agreements as evidence of that bound-
ary.218 Peru argued that this boundarywould be “totally inequitable”: it would giveChile a full
200 nm maritime extension, whereas Peru would suffer “a severe cut-off effect.”219
The parties agreed that their 1947 proclamations had not established an international mar-
itime boundary between them.220 As for the 1952 Santiago Declaration, which was central to
Chile’s case, bothChile andPeruno longer contested that itwas an international treaty.221The
main focus of the SantiagoDeclaration was the preservation of maritime resources. Paragraph
IV of the SantiagoDeclaration was the key provision in this case: it createdmaritime zones for
islands on the basis of a parallel of latitude.222 Chile argued that this paragraph did not just set
up a special regime for islands but that it also made clear that the maritime boundary between
Chile andPeruwas “the parallel of latitude passing through the point at which the land bound-
ary between [the two states] reach[ed] the sea.”223 The Court turned to the customary inter-
national lawof treaty interpretation as reflected inArticles 31 and32of theViennaConvention
on the Law of Treaties.224 On the basis of the ordinary meaning, it found that paragraph IV
did not establish a general rule.225 The Court confirmed this conclusion by reference to the
object and purpose of the treaty, which was “the conservation and protection of the necessary
natural resources . . . through the extensionof themaritime zones.”226Ashas been its common
practice in recent cases, the Court said that it need not take account of travaux pre´paratoires,
but it nevertheless considered the relevant material that confirmed its interpretation.227
The Court therefore rejected Chile’s central argument that the 1952 Santiago Declaration
had established a maritime boundary on the basis of a parallel of latitude.228 However, it went
on to find that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement (1954 Agreement)
acknowledged that a maritime boundary between Chile and Peru already existed by its refer-
ence inArticle 1 to the parallel, which constitutes themaritimeboundary: “TheParties’ express
acknowledgment of its existence can only reflect a tacit agreementwhich they had reached ear-
lier.”229 The Court recognized that the 1954 Agreement did “not indicate when and by what
means that boundary was agreed upon.”230 It gave no indication of the nature or extent of the
216 Declaration on the Maritime Zone, Chile-Ecuador-Peru, Aug. 18, 1952, 1006 UNTS 326 (Santiago Dec-
laration), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201006/volume-1006-I-14758-
English.pdf.
217 Maritime Dispute, supra note 203, para. 51.
218 Id., paras. 78–99.
219 On the positions of the parties, see id., paras. 22–23.
220 Id., paras. 25–44.
221 Id., paras. 45–48.
222 Id., para. 49.
223 Id., para. 51.
224 Id., para. 57.
225 Id., paras. 57–70.
226 Id., para. 63.
227 Id., para. 66.
228 Id., para. 70.
229 Id., para. 91 (emphasis added).
230 Id.
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maritime boundary.231 The Court nevertheless, on the basis of the context of the 1947 Proc-
lamations and the 1952 Santiago Declaration, agreed with Chile that the boundary was “an
all-purpose one,” applicable to the water column and the seabed.232
The Court made this central finding by fifteen votes to one. Only Judge Sebutinde dis-
sented. She said that theCourtwas not justified in finding a “tacit agreement.”233 As she noted,
in the past, the Court had required a “stringent and well-established standard of proof” for the
existence of such a tacit agreement in boundary cases.234 Judges Hisashi Owada and Bernardo
Sepu´lveda-Amor actually accepted her central point, that the stringent standard had not been
met, but they were willing to vote with themajority on the basis of a “tacit agreement”235—or
the possibility of such a tacit agreement—even though the judgment should have provided a
systematic and rigorous analysis of the parties’ conduct.236
Thus, Chile was successful in its claim of an existing maritime boundary along a parallel of
latitude. The key question then arising was whether this line should extend to 200 nm.237 If
so, it would not only subject Peru to a “severe cut-off effect,” but it would also leave an area
beyond the end of the 200 nm shared boundary that would be within 200 nm of Peru’s coast
and over which it would have sovereign rights (the outer triangle).238 The Court then shifted
its approach and avoided this potentially inequitable and inconvenient result.239
The Court’s reasoning here does not seem consistent with the approach that it had adopted
in the first part of its judgment. It no longer focused on the context provided by the 1947 proc-
lamations of the 200 nm zones. Instead, it held that the purpose of the 1954 Agreement was
“narrow and specific”: it referred to the existingmaritime boundary to establish a “zone of tol-
erance” for fishing activity by small vessels.240 TheCourt took account of the relatively limited
extent of such activity in 1954. It said that the all-purpose nature of the maritime boundary
could not be “determinative of the extent of that boundary.”241 The fishing activity and other
practices at the relevant time provided some support for the view that, when the parties
acknowledged the existence of an agreedmaritime boundary, they “were unlikely to have con-
sidered that it extended all the way to the 200-nautical-mile limit.”242 At that time, general
acceptance of a 200 nm exclusive economic zone did not yet exist.243 Subsequent practice did
not alter this position.244 The Court therefore concluded that the agreed maritime boundary
231 Id., para. 92.
232 Id., paras. 100–02.
233 Id., Diss. Op. Sebutinde, J., para. 7.
234 Id., para. 6 (citing Territorial andMaritimeDispute BetweenNicaragua andHonduras in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicar. v. Hond.), 2007 ICJ REP. 659, para. 253 (Oct. 8)).
235 Id., Sep. Op. Owada, J., para. 25.
236 Id., Decl. Sepulveda-Amor, J., paras. 5, 18.
237 See id., para. 103 ( Judgment).
238 Id., para. 23.
239 Id., paras. 103–17.
240 Id., para. 89.
241 Id., para. 111.
242 Id.
243 Id., para. 116 (“As the Court has noted previously, in this period the concept of an exclusive economic zone
of 200 nautical miles was ‘still some long years away.’”).
244 Id., paras. 119–48.
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along the parallel did not extend beyond 80 nm from its starting point.245 The acknowledg-
ment in 1954 that a maritime boundary existed was “too weak a basis for holding that it
extended far beyond the Parties’ extractive and enforcement capacity at that time.”246 The
Court recognized “someuncertainty as to the precise length of the agreedmaritimeboundary,”
but, by ten votes to six, selected the figure of 80 nm.247 As five dissenting judges pointed out,
little compelling evidence justified the choice of this distance, rather than 200 nm.248
The Court then established the starting point of the maritime boundary.249 Although the
parties disagreed about the starting point of the land boundary, the Court held that the parties
hadby their behavior shownagreement on the starting point of themaritimeboundary.250The
Court was almost unanimous on its identification of this point, with the exception of Judge
Giorgio Gaja, who was not pleased that its decision meant that the starting point of the mar-
itime boundary could be different from that of the land boundary.251
The Court thereafter considered the course of the boundary beyond the 80 nm limit on the
parallel of latitude.252 Chile, but not Peru, is a party to theUnitedNations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Court accordingly proceeded on the basis that UNCLOSArti-
cles 74(1) and 83(1), on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf, reflect customary international law.253 These articles provide for delimitation by agree-
ment in order to achieve an equitable solution. The Court asserted that it “usually” employed
a three-stage methodology in maritime boundary cases.254 In fact, this methodology had only
relatively recently been expressly adopted in the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case,
a unanimous judgment with no separate opinions by any of the judges.255 Before that judg-
ment, a two-stage approach had been used.256
Under the three-stage methodology, the Court first “constructs a provisional equidistance
line”; it next “considers whether there are relevant circumstances whichmay call for an adjust-
ment of that line to achieve an equitable result”; and it then completes the process by conduct-
ing “a disproportionality test in which it assesses whether the effect of the line, as adjusted, is
such that the Parties’ respective shares of the relevant area aremarkedly disproportionate to the
245 Id., paras. 108, 117.
246 Id., para. 149.
247 Id., paras. 151, 198.
248 Id., Diss. Op. Xue, Gaja, Bhandari, JJ. &Orrego Vicun˜a, J. ad hoc, paras. 2, 9, 34; id., Diss. Op. Sebutinde,
J., para. 14; see also id., Decl. Tomka, P., paras. 1, 3, 4, 25. Judge Leonid Skotnikov (Russian Federation) said that
no evidence supported the 80 nm point, but, because the parties’ treatment of the extent of the maritime boundary
lacked “clarity,” he could join the majority. Id., Decl. Skotnikov, J., paras. 6–7.
249 Id., paras. 152–76 ( Judgment).
250 Id., paras. 164–74.
251 Id., para. 198; id., Decl. Gaja, J.
252 Id., paras. 177–95 ( Judgment).
253 Id., para. 179 (quoting UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Arts. 74(1), 83(1), opened for signatureDec.
10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, 21 ILM 1261 (1982)).
254 Id., para. 180.
255 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), 2009 ICJ REP. 61, paras. 115–22 (Feb. 3) [here-
inafter Black SeaDelimitation]. InTerritorial andMaritimeDispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 2012 ICJ REP. 624,
para. 194 (Nov. 19), the Court said that this three-stage process was not to be applied in a mechanical fashion.
256 SeeDispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh andMyanmar in the
Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), ITLOS Case No. 16, paras. 227–34 (Mar. 14, 2012), available at https://www.itl
os.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/C16_Judgment_14_03_2012_rev.pdf (discussing ICJ mar-
itime-boundary jurisprudence).
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lengths of their respective coasts.”257 TheCourtwas divided by ten votes to six on the adoption
of the equidistance method.258 Chile had advanced no arguments on the application of the
equidistance method because its position all along was that the boundary was the parallel of
latitude.259 Given the Court’s adoption of the equidistance line, it had no need to decide on
Peru’s “outer triangle” argument; that area of the sea now lay onPeru’s side of the boundary.260
In this case, the delimitation by the Court was to begin, not at the low-water line, but
at the 80 nm endpoint of the agreed maritime boundary.261 This delimitation was not
unprecedented: as the Court indicated, other cases had ruled that the delimitation began at a
point seaward of the low-water line.262 However, the Court acknowledged that the situation
was “unusual in that the starting-point for thedelimitation in this case [was]much further from
the coast.”263 The Court constructed a provisional equidistance line that continued until the
257 Maritime Dispute, supra note 203, para. 180.
258 Id., para. 198.
259 Id., paras. 14, 182, 188.
260 Id., para. 189.
261 Id., para. 177.
262 Id., para. 183 (citing Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984
ICJ REP. 246, para. 212 (Oct. 12); Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria; Eq.Guinea Intervening), 2002 ICJREP. 303, paras. 268–69 (Oct. 10); Black SeaDelimitation, supranote
255, para. 218).
263 Id.
FIGURE 2. MARITIME DELIMITATION BETWEEN PERU AND CHILE
Source: Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Sketch-Map No. 4, Course of the Maritime Boundary, at 66 (Int’l
Ct. Justice Jan. 27, 2014).
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200 nm limits measured out from the parties’ coasts no longer overlapped.264 After that point,
the line changed direction for a short stretch to follow theChilean coast. TheCourt found that
there were no relevant circumstances requiring any adjustment of the provisional equidistance
line.265 As for the third stage, the disproportionality test, the Court admitted that it faced an
unusual situation in that the equidistance line did not start until the endpoint of the agreed
nautical boundary, which was 80 nm from the coast.266 The disproportionality test had been
conceived as applying only in delimitation on the basis of equidistance.267 Nevertheless, the
Court persisted in paying lip service to the three-stage approach. It simply held that “no sig-
nificant disproportion [was] evident.”268
This judgment is the latest in a long line of maritime boundary cases decided by the ICJ;
given the specific facts of the case, it is unlikely that it will serve as a precedent for the future.
One of the peculiar features of the case, though not unique to this case,269 is that the parties
had not presented arguments to theCourt on the length of the tacitly agreed boundary. In par-
ticular, they were not able to give their views to the Court on the 80 nm limit or on the appli-
cation of the disproportionality test. Judge Donoghue suggested in her declaration that it
might have been advisable to have asked the parties to set out their positions on these points.270
II. CONCLUSION
In all three cases, the Court’s reasoning is open to criticism on the grounds of lack of coher-
ence or lack of clarity on central issues, but, in all three cases, the actual conclusions seem rea-
sonable. Those who look for logic in legal reasoning may be disappointed by the Court’s
approach; others may be content that the results in all these cases appear just. Thus, in Peru v.
Chile, the Court provided no adequate explanation of its finding of a tacit agreement estab-
lishing a maritime boundary along a parallel of latitude; its identification of 80 nm as the end
point of that line seems less than convincing; but the final result seems equitable in a way that
a more coherent pursuit of the boundary to a 200 nm limit would not have been. InWhaling
in the Antarctic, theCourt held that Japan’s JARPA II programwas broadly “scientific research”
but was not “for purposes of” scientific research; it did not draw the logical inference that the
programwas commercial whaling. And inTimor-Leste v. Australia, theCourt accepted as plau-
sible what seemed obvious to everyone except Australia, that it is not lawful for a state to seize
documents anddata from the lawyers of another (smaller,weaker, andpoorer) state.TheCourt
paid lip service to Australia’s written undertaking but nevertheless found it necessary (without
a full explanation) to order two provisional measures. In both Whaling in the Antarctic and
Timor-Leste v. Australia, the Court avoided direct findings of bad faith against the respondent
states.
264 Id., para. 186.
265 Id., para. 191.
266 Id., paras. 192–94.
267 Id., para. 193.
268 Id., para. 194.
269 See, e.g., Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1982 ICJ REP. 18 (Feb. 24) (noting that the Court created the
doctrine of giving half effect to islands without any argument from the parties on this point).
270 Id., Decl. Donoghue, J.
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The impact of the cases on the development of international law is clearly limited. Timor-
Leste v. Australia raised interesting questions about the scope of the principle of sovereign
equality; Peru v. Chile confirms the central role of the equidistance line in maritime delimi-
tation.Whaling in the Antarctic is obviously the most important, although the Court’s under-
standably cautious approach reduces its general significance. Furthermore, the judgment has
not ended the disputes on Japan’s use of the special permit system, which has allowed Japan
to continue its whale harvests. The main importance of the case lies in incidental matters: the
question of standing and legal interest, the Court’s use of experts, and its attempt to deal with
complex scientific evidence.
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